Ethically Yours

Melden, A. I. (1967). Ethical theories; a book of readings (2d ed.). Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,: Prentice-Hall.

"Kant’s outward life was wholly uneventful. He never traveled more than forty miles from his birthplace in the eighty years of his life, and his townspeople would set their watches as he came into view during his daily constitutional." — Melden

"His devotion to the principle that human beings are to be treated as ends and never merely as means is central in his ethics and politics, and nothing seemed more dreadful to this man than that any person should be degraded by the tyranny of another man’s will." — Melden

Quotes from Foundation to the Metaphysics of Morals

Preface

"Formal philosophy is called logic. Material philosophy…is itself divided into to parts…laws are either laws of nature [physics] or laws of freedom [morality]." 318

"All philosophy, so far as it is based on experience, may be called empirical; but, so far as it presents its doctrines solely on the basis of a priori principles, it may be called pure philosophy. The latter, when merely formal, is logic; when limited to definite objects of understanding, it is metaphysics." 318

"In ethics, however, the empirical part may be called more specifically practical anthropology; the rational part, morals proper." 318

"Is it not of the utmost necessity to construct a pure moral philosophy which is completely freed from everything which may be only empirical and thus belong to anthropology?" 319

"A metaphysics of morals is therefore indispensable…because morals themselves remain subject to all kinds of corruption so long as the guide and supreme norm of their correct estimation is lacking." 319

"For it is not sufficient to that which should be morally good that it conform to the law; it must be done for the sake of the law." 319

"The present foundation, however, are nothing more than the search for and establishment of the supreme principle of morality." 321

Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889 – 1951) The Limits of Language

A good resource for further questions or explorations of philosophical issues:  http://www.reddit.com/r/askphilosophy/

If you see stoic9 that’s me.

More quotes from the Leviathan

Melden, A. I. (1967). Ethical theories; a book of readings (2d ed.). Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,: Prentice-Hall.

"The RIGHT OF NATURE, which writers commonly call jus naturale, is the liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature." (224)

"By LIBERTY…the absence of external impediments." (225)

"A LAW OF NATURE, lex naturalis, is a precept or general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that, which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same; and to omit that, by which he thinketh it may be best preserved." (225)

"The first branch of which rule containeth the first, and fundamental law of Nature; which is to seek peace, and follow it. The second, the sum of the right of Nature: which is, by all means we can, to defend ourselves." (225)

"second law; that a man be willing, when others are so too, as far-forth, as for peace, and defense of himself be shall think it necessary to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men as he would allow other men against himself." (225)

"if other men will not lay down their right as well as he; then there is no reason for any one to divest himself of his." (225)

"The mutual transferring of right, is that which men call contract." (226)

"For where no covenant hath preceded, there hath no right been transferred, and every man has right to everything; and consequently, no action can be unjust. But when a covenant is made, then to break it is unjust: and the definition of INJUSTICE, is no other than the not performance of covenant. And whatsoever is not unjust, is just." (227)

"Therefore, before the names of just, and unjust can have place, there must be some coercive power, to compel men equally to the performance of their covenants, by the terror of some punishment, greater than then the benefit they expect by the breach of their covenant." (227)

"The fourth law of Nature…that a man which receiveth benefit from another of mere grace, endeavour that he which giveth it, have no reasonable cause to repent him of his good will." (227)

"A fifth law of Nature…that every man strive to accommodate himself to the rest." (227)

"A sixth law of Nature…that upon caution of the future time, a man ought to pardon the offences past of them that repenting, deserve it." (228)

"A seventh is, that in revenges, that is, retribution of evil for evil, men look not at the greatness of the evil past, but the greatness of the good to follow." (228)

"eighth place, for a law of nature, set down this precept, that no man by deed, word, contenance, or gesture, declare hatred, or contempt of another." (228)

"ninth law of Nature…that every man acknowledge another for his equal by nature…On this law dependeth another, that at the entrance into conditions of peace, no man require to reserve to himself any right, which he is not content should be reserved to every on of the rest." (228)

"if a man be trusted to judge between man and man, it is a precept of the law of nature, that he deal equally between them." (229)

"that such things as cannot be divided, be enjoyed in common, if it can be; and if the quantity of the thing permit, without stint; otherwise proportionably to the number of them that have right…that the entire right, or else, making the use alternate, the first possession, be determined by lot…Of lots there by two sorts, arbitrary and natural. Arbitrary is that which is agreed on by the competitors; natural is either primo-geniture…which signifies, given by lot; or first seizure." (229)

"It is also a law of nature, that all men that mediate peace, be allowed safe conduct." (229)

"it is of the law of nature, that they that are at controversy, submit their right to the judgment of an arbitrator…seeing every man is presumed to do all things in order to his own benefit, no man is a fit arbitrator in his own cause." (229)

"Do not that to another, which thou woudst not have done to thyself." (230)

"The laws of Nature are immutable and eternal; for injustice, ingratitude, arrogance, pride, iniquity acception of persons, and the rest, can never be made lawful. For it can never be that war shall preserve life, and peace destroy it." (230)

"For moral philosophy is nothing else but the science of good, and evil, in the conversation and society of mankind. Good, and evil, are names that signify our appetites, and aversions; which in different tempers, customs, and doctrines of men, are different: and divers men, differ not only in their judgment, on the senses of what is pleasant, and unpleasant to the taste, smell, hearing, touch, sight; but also of what is conformable or disagreeable to reason, in the actions of common life. Nay, the same man, in divers times, differs from himself; and one time praiseth, that is, calleth good, what another time he dispraiseth, and calleth evil: from whence arise disputes, controversies, and at last war. And therefore so long as a man is in the condition of mere nature, which is a condition of war, as private appetite is the measure of good and evil: and consequently all men agree on this, that peace is good, and therefore also the way or means of peace, which, as I have shewed before, are justice, gratitude, modesty, equity, mercy, and the rest of the laws of Nature, are good; that is to say, moral virtues; and their contrary vices, evil.

Thomas Hobbes (1588 – 1679)

Excerpts from Leviathan

“There be in animals, two sorts of motions peculiar to them: one called vital…the other is animal motion, otherwise called voluntary motion.” (218-219)

“These small beginnings of motion…when it is toward something which causes it, is called APPETITE, or DESIRE…when the endeavor is fromward something, it is generally called AVERSION.” (219)

“That which men desire, they are also said to LOVE, and to HATE those things for which they have aversion…by desire, we always signify the absence of the object: by love, most commonly the presence of the same. So also by aversion, we signify the absence; and by hate, the presence of the object.” (219)

“But whatsoever is the object of any man’s appetite or desire, that is it which he for his part calleth good: and the object of his hate and aversion, evil; and of his contempt, vile and inconsiderable. For these words of good, evil, and contemptible, are ever used with relation to the person that useth them: there being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common rule of good and evil, to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves; but from the person of the man, where there is no Commonwealth; or, in a Commonwealth, from the person that representeth it; or from an arbitrator or judge, whom men disagreeing shall by consent set up, and make his sentence the rule thereof.” (220)

“There is no such finis ultimus, utmost aim, nor summum bonum, greatest good, as it spoken of in the books of the old moral philosophers.” (221)

“I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death.” (221)

“Desire of ease, and sensual delight, disposeth men to obey a common power…Desire of knowledge, and arts of peace, inclineth men to obey a common power.” (221-222)

“Desire of knowledge, and arts of peace, inclineth men to obey a common power.” (221)

“Nature hath made men so equal, in the faculties of the body, and mind; as that though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind than another, yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit to which another may not pretend, as well as he.” (222)

“From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their end, which is principally their own conservation, and sometimes their delectation only, endeavour to destroy or subdue one another.” (222)

“So that in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel. First, competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory. The first maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third, for reputation.” (223)

“During the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called WAR; and such a war, as is of every man, against every man…In such a condition, there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain, and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments o moving, and removing, such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and, which is worst of all, continual fear, and gander of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” (223)

“The desires, and other passions of man, are in themselves no sin. No more are the actions, that proceed from those passions, till laws be made they cannot know, nor can any law be made, till they have agreed upon the person that shall make it.” (224)

“To this war of every man, against every man, this also is consequent; that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right or wrong, justice and injustice, have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is no law: where no law, no justice. Force and fraud, are in war the two cardinal virtues.” (224)

“It is consequent also to the same condition, that there by no propriety, no dominion, no mine and thine distinct; but only that to be every man’s, that he can get; and for so long, as he can keep it.” (224)

“The passions that incline men to peace, are fear of death; desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a hope by their industry to obtain them. And reason suggesteth convenient articles of peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement. These articles, are they, which otherwise are called the Laws of Nature.” (224)

Melden, A. I. (1967). Ethical theories; a book of readings (2d ed.). Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,: Prentice-Hall.

Link to the Prison University Project:  http://www.prisonuniversityproject.org/

Melden, A. I. (1967). Ethical theories; a book of readings (2d ed.). Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,: Prentice-Hall.

From these we might check out the "Problem of Evil" or consider modern medicine…

"Thus the true cause of the blessedness of the good angels is found to be this, that they cleave to Him who supremely is. And if we ask the cause of the misery of the bad, it occurs to us, and not unreasonably, that they are miserable because they have forsaken Him who supremely is, and have turned to themselves who have no such essence." 164

"For the Almighty God, who, as even heather acknowledge, has supreme power over all things, being Himself supremely good, would never permit the existence of anything evil among His works, if He were not so omnipotent and good that He can bring good even out of evil. For what is that which we call evil but the absence of good? In the bodies of animals, disease and wounds mean nothing but the absence of health; for when a cure is effected, that does not mean that the evils which were present–namely, the diseases and wounds–go away from the body and dwell elsewhere: they altogether cease to exist; for the wound or disease is not a substance, but a defect in the fleshly substance — the flesh itself being a substance, and therefore something good, of which those evils–that is, privations of the good which we call health–are accidents." 169

"There can be no evil where there is no good." 170

"In the case of these contraries which we call good and evil, the rule of the logicians, that two contraries cannot be predicated at the same time of the same thing, does not hold. No weather is at the same time dark and bright: no food or drink is at the same time sweet and bitter: no body is at the same time and in the sample place black and white: none is at the same time and in the same place deformed and beautiful." 171

"The fact that evil as well as good exists, is a good." 171

"If a bad son wishes his father to die, when this is also the will of God." 172

"God accomplishes some of His purposes, which of course are all good, through the evil desires of wicked men: for example, it was through the wicked designs of the Jews, working out the good purpose of the Father, that Christ was slain; and this event was so truly good, that when the Apostle Peter expressed his unwillingness that it should take place, he was designated Satan by Him who had come to be slain." 172

"If, then, we be asked what…the supreme good and evil is, … [we] reply that life eternal is the supreme good, death eternal the supreme evil, and that to obtain the one and escape the other we must live rightly…we do not as yet see our good, and must therefore life by faith; neither have we in ourselves power to live rightly, but can do so only if He who has given us faith to believe in His help do help us when we believe and pray." 173

"As man has a rational soul, he subordinates all this which he has in common with the beasts to the peace of his rational soul, that his intellect may have free play and may regulate his actions, and that he may thus enjoy the well-ordered harmony of knowledge and action which constitutes, as we have said, the peace of the rational soul." 177

"And this is the order of this concord, that a man, in the first place, injure no one, and, in the second, do good to every one he can reach." 177

"For they who care fro the rest rule — the husband the wife, the parents the children, the masters the servants; and they we are cared for obey — the women their husbands, the children their parents, the servants their masters. But in the family of the just man who lives by faith and is as yet a pilgrim journeying on to the celestial city, even those who rule serve those whom they seem to command; for they rule not from a love of power, but from a sense of the duty they owe to others — not because they are proud of authority, but because they love mercy." 177

"For the first freedom of will which man received when he was created upright consisted in an ability not to sin, but also in an ability to sin; whereas this last freedom of will shall be superior, inasmuch as it shall not be able to sin." 185

Interesting how many ideals from Stoic philosophy can be found in later interpretations of Xtianity…and in AA. Good read if death bothers you. Also fun if you compare to zennish ideals.

Melden, A. I. (1967). Ethical theories; a book of readings (2d ed.). Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,: Prentice-Hall.

"Of things some are in our power, and others are not." (150)

"If it relates to anything which is not in our power, be ready to say, that it does not concern you."

"Men are disturbed not by the things which happen, but by the opinions about the things." (152)

"Seek not that the things which happen should happen as you wish; but wish the things which happen to be as they are, and you will have a tranquil flow of life." (152)

"On the occasion of every accident (event) that befalls you, remember to turn to yourself and inquire what power you have for turning it to use.’ (152)

"Practice then this which you are able to do. He is the master of every man who has the power over the things, which another person wishes or does not wish, the power to confer them on him or to take them away. Whoever then wishes to be free, let him neither wish for anything nor avoid anything which depends on others: if he does not observer this rule, he must be a slave." (153)

"For this is your duty, to act well the part that is given you; but to select the part, belongs to another." (154)

"You can be invincible, if you enter into no contest in which it is not in your power to conquer." (154) (C.f. The Book of Five Rings)

"Remember that it is not he who reviles you or strikes you, who insults you, but it is your opinion about these things as being insulting. When then a man irritates you, you must know that it is your own opinion which has irritated you. Therefore especially try not to be carried away by the appearance. For if you once gain time and delay, you will more easily master yourself." (154) (C.f. Roadhouse…3:00-3:16)

"As a mark is not set up for the purpose of missing the aim, so neither does the nature of evil exist in the world." (156)

"You must be one man, either good or bad." (157)

"Duties are universally measured by relations." (157)

"For another will not damage you, unless you choose: but you will be damaged then when you shall think that you are damaged." (157)

"For if it is any of the things which are not in our power, it is absolutely necessary that it must be neither good nor bad." (158)

"Refuse altogether to take an oath, if it is possible: if it is not, refuse as far as you are able." (159)

"If your companion be impure, he also who keeps company with him must become impure, though he should happen to be pure." (159)

"As to pleasure with women, abstain as far as you can before marriage: but if you do indulge in it, do it in the way in which is conformable to custom. Do not however be disagreeable to those who indulge in these pleasures, or reprove them; and do not often boast that you do not indulge in them yourself." (159)

"If a man has reported to you, that a certain person speaks ill of you, do not make any defense (answer) to what has been told you: but reply, The man did not know the rest of my faults, for he would not have mentioned these only." (159)

"When you are going to meet with any person, and particularly one of those who are considered to be in a superior condition, place before yourself what Socrates or Zeno would have done in such circumstances, and you will have no difficulty in making a proper use of the occasion." (159)

"When you are decided that a thing ought to be done and are doing it, never avoid being seen doing it, thought the many shall form an unfavorable opinion about it. For if it is not right to do it, avoid doing the thing; but if it is right, why are you afraid for those who shall find fault wrongly?" (160)

"These reasons do not cohere: I am richer than you, therefore I am better than you; I am more eloquent than you, therefore I am better than you. On the contrary these rather cohere, I am richer than you, therefore my possessions are greater than yours: I am more eloquent than you, therefore my speech is superior to yours. But you are neither possession nor speech." (161)

"At a banquet do not say how a man ought to eat, but east as you ought to eat." (162)

"For even sheep do not vomit up their grass and show to the shepherds how much they have eaten; but when they have internally digested the pasture, they produce externally wool and milk. Do you also show not your theorems to the uninstructed, but show the acts which come from their digestion." (162)

"When a man is proud because he can understand and explain the writings of Chrysippus, say to yourself, If Chrysippus had not written obscurely, this man would have nothing to be proud of." (162) (C.f. Derek Parfit)

Melden, A. I. (1967). Ethical theories; a book of readings (2d ed.). Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,: Prentice-Hall.

Epicurus

These quotes touch on many common themes we have seen in PHI101: 

• Philosophy as a spiritual or developmental quest
• Being careful to ascribe attributes to a thing
• Short term v. long term pleasures
• The “happy” life
• Friendship
• The Harm Principle
• Justice

"Let no one when young delay to study philosophy, nor when he is old grow weary of his study. For no one can come too early or too late to secure the health of the soul. " (143)

"First of all believe that god is a being immortal and blessed…and do not assign to him anything alien to his immortality or ill-suited to his blessedness. " (144)

"And the impious man is not he who denies the gods of the many, but he who attaches to the gods the beliefs of the many." (144)

"Become accustomed to the belief that death is nothing to us…the wise man neither seeks to escape life nor fears the cessation of life." (144)

""We must then bear in mind that the future is neither ours, nor yet wholly not ours, so that we may not altogether expect it as sure to come, nor abandon hope of it, as if it will certainly not come." (144)

"Sometimes we pass over many pleasures, when greater discomfort accrues to use as the result of them: and similarly we think many pains better than pleasures, since a greater pleasure comes to use when we have endured pains for a long time." (145)

"It is not continuous drinking and revellings, nor the satisfaction of lusts, nor the enjoyment of fish and other luxuries of the wealthy table, which produce a pleasant life, but sober reasoning, searching out the motives of all choice and avoidance, and banishing mere opinions, to which are due the greatest disturbance of the spirit." (145)

"A man cannot dispel his fear about the most important matters if he does not know what is the nature of the universe but suspects the truth of some mythical story. So that without natural science it is not possible to attain our pleasures unalloyed." (147)

"Of all the things which wisdom acquires to produce the blessedness of the complete life, far the greatest is the possession of friendship." (148)

"The justice which arises from nature is a pledge of mutual advantage to restrain men from harming one another and save them from being harmed." (148)

"If a man makes a law and it does not turn out to lead to advantage in men’s dealings with each other, then it no longer has the essential nature of justice." (149)

More quotes…

"Since virtue is concerned with passions and actions, and on voluntary passions and actions praise and blame are bestowed, on those that are involuntary pardon, and sometimes also pity, to distinguish the voluntary and the involuntary is presumable necessary for those who are studying the nature of virtue, and useful also for legislators with a view to the assigning both of honours and of punishments." (110)

"Both the terms, then, ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary,’ must be used with reference to the moment of action. Now the man acts voluntarily; for the principle that moves the instrumental parts of the body in such actions is in him, and the things of which the moving principle is in a man himself are in his power to do or not to do. Such actions, therefore, are voluntary, but in the abstract perhaps involuntary; for no one would choose any such act in itself." (111)

"What sort of act, then, should be called compulsory?" (111)

"Acting by reason of ignorance seems also to be different from acting in ignorance; for the man who is drunk or in a rage is thought to act as a result not of ignorance but of one of the causes mentioned, yet not knowingly but in ignorance." (112)

"That which is done under compulsion or by reason of ignorance is involuntary.’ (112)

"Choice, then, seems to be voluntary, but not the same thing as the voluntary; the latter extends more widely. For both children and the lower animals share voluntary action, but not in choice, and acts done on the spur of the moment we describe as voluntary, but not as chosen." (113)

"Do we deliberate about everything, and is everything a possible subject of deliberation, or is deliberation impossible about some things?" (114)

"We deliberate not about ends but about means. For a doctor does not deliberate whether he shall heal, nor an orator whether he shall persuade, nor a statesman whether he shall produce law and order, not does any one else deliberate about his end." (114)

"We therefore choose the pleasant as a good, and avoid pain as an evil." (116)

"In all the states of character we have mentioned, as in all other matters, there is a mark to which the man who has the rule looks, and heightens or relaxes his activity accordingly, and there is a standard which determines the mean states which we say are intermediate between excess and defect, being in accordance with the right rule…but if a man had only this knowledge he would be none the wiser." (118)

"The virtue of a thing is relative to its proper work." (119)

"Let it be assumed that the states by virtue of which the soul possesses truth by way of affirmation or denial are five in number, i.e., art, scientific knowledge, practical wisdom, philosophic wisdom, intuitive reason; we do not include judgment and opinion because in these we may be mistaken." (119)

"The object of scientific knowledge is of necessity." (119)

"All art is concerned with coming into being…a state concerned with making." (120)

"Practical wisdom…is a true and reasoned state of capacity to act with regard to the things that are good or bad for man." (120-121)

"Philosophic wisdom…is intuitive reason that grasps the first principles." (121)

"Wisdom must be intuitive reason combined with scientific knowledge." (122)

"Man is not the best thing in the world." (122)

"Practical wisdom is concerned with action." (122)

"When young men become geometricians and mathematicians and wise in matters like these, it is thought that a young man of practical wisdom cannot be found. The cause is that such wisdom is concerned not only with universals but with particulars, which become familiar from experience, but a young man has no experience, for it is length of time that gives experience; indeed one might ask this question too, why a boy may become a mathematician, but not a philosopher or a physicist. It is because the objects of mathematics exist by abstraction, while the first principles of these other subjects come from experience, and because young men have no conviction about the latter but merely use the proper language, while the essence of mathematical objects is plain enough to them?" (123)

"Practical wisdom issues commands, since its end is what ought to be done or not to be done; but understanding only judges." (125)